Aristotle was wont to say that most of those who heard Plato's Discourse on the Good had the following experience. Each came thinking he would be told something about one of the recognised human goods, such as Wealth, Health or Strength, or, in sum, some marvellous Happiness. But when it appeared that Plato was to talk on Mathematics and Numbers and Geometry and Astronomy, leading up to the statement that the Good was Unity, they were overwhelmed by the paradox of (...) the whole matter. Some then pooh-poohed the whole thing and others were outraged by it.1. (shrink)

Suppose that the ontological argument is in fact valid, but has never been shown to be so: what would be required to demonstrate that validity? In principle the demonstration is simple: we need a clear and generally acceptable definition of “the greatest perfection,” another of “existence,” and an argument showing that the first entails the second. But in practice, of course, the problem is that philosophers do not have such definitions.

“Renascent Rationalism represents a new and provocative departure from the mostly barren currents of twentieth-century philosophy. The author, enlisting the aid of theoretical science, leads off from the tradition of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Russell and then steps well beyond. The result is a single, integrated philosophical system resting in direct opposition to the contemporary positions of analysis, empiricism, pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology.There are four major effects of Helier Robinson’s acceptance of the Leibniz-Russell theory of perception as his base: (...) all the philosophic problems of perception are solved; a whole new philosophy of science develops; an entirely new theory of mind emerges; and some startling theological and ethical consequences ensue. The art of metaphysical speculation is thus revived.Renascent Rationalism offers a clear, if controversial, alternative to the dominating influence of Hume and Kant and the resulting blind alleys of much modern philosophizing.”- Publisher. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that, to a great extent, the way we think depends upon the categories we think with. In this paper I propose to introduce a group of related categories which, if they do not obviously lead to new discoveries, at least provide new ways of understanding and interrelating old ideas. The basic category I am concerned with is that of imperceptibles: not particularly a new one, but always previously a confused one because proper definition of it requires (...) specification of the perceiver. I wish to propose a set of definitions which cures such ambiguities, and then to examine some of the uses to which it may be put. (shrink)

To say that something is extreme, as solipsism is, implies that there exists a spectrum of which this extremity is one limit. Knowing one limit, we are then curious about the other, the opposite end of the spectrum. In many cases the answer is too well-known to cause comment: i.e., the spectrum of greyness has black as one extreme and white as the other. But in the case of solipsism neither the spectrum nor the other extreme is obvious.